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The Role of Recommendations and 
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  We explore the effects of recommended play and the presentation of payoff information on 
behavior in an ambient-based policy instrument experiment. Specifically, we test the effects of 
recommended play (via a description of marginal decision making) and a payoff table on the 
behavior of individuals facing an ambient-based policy instrument. We find that recommended 
play and the presentation of a payoff table increases the use of the socially optimal strategy, 
thereby increasing efficiency. These results suggest that providing decision makers with a 
richer description of the decision making environment significantly reduces decision error, 
significantly improving the efficiency of ambient-based policy instruments. 
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In the literature on non-point source pollution, 
there is mixed evidence on the ability of ambient 
pollution mechanisms to implement efficient out-
comes. For example, while authors such as Suter, 
Vossler, and Poe (2009), Vossler et al. (2006), 
Cochard, Willinger, and Xepapadeas (2005), Al-
pizar, Requate, and Schram (2004), Poe et al. 
(2004), and Spraggon (2002, 2004a) provide ex-
perimental evidence that mechanisms based on 
the work of Segerson (1988) can result in the im-
plementation of group pollution targets, this im-
plementation occurs in an inefficient manner in 
terms of which polluters are reducing their emis-
sions. Some have argued theoretically (e.g., Shortle 
and Horan 2001) that these mechanisms are gen-
erally less successful in reducing emissions to 
targets than other means and may be appropriate 
only in simple cases (Weersink et al. 1998). 
  Cabe and Herriges (1992) argue that it is fun-
damental for the regulator to educate the polluters 
as to the importance of compliance with the in-
strument. In this paper, we consider whether the 
inefficiency of these instruments in the laboratory 
is due to problems inherent in the instrument or 
problems with the manner in which participants 
approach these instruments. That is, we seek to 
determine if we can improve the ability of ambi-
ent pollution instruments to induce individuals to 
make socially optimal decisions by better edu-
cating the subjects about the marginal nature of 
optimal decision making in terms of their final 
payoff. 
  There has been a concerted effort by a number 
of researchers to determine the feasibility of im-
plementing ambient-based policy instruments using 
controlled laboratory experiments (Suter, Vossler, 
and Poe 2009, Spraggon and Oxoby 2009, Oxoby 
and Spraggon 2008, Vossler et al. 2006, Cochard, 
Willinger, and Xepapadeas 2005, Alpizar, Requate, 
and Schram 2004, Poe et al. 2004, and Spraggon 
2002, 2004a). Broadly speaking, these studies 
show that under a wide range of assumptions (e.g., 
number of polluters, heterogeneity of polluters, 
subject pool, and communication) these instru-
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ments can be effective at controlling the ambient 
level of pollution. However, these studies also 
suggest that in a field setting there may be signi-
ficant losses in efficiency due to the inequitable 
distribution of emissions reduction among firms, 
which may have real effects on the structure of 
the industry [Suter, Vossler, and Poe (2009); see 
Giordana and Willinger (forthcoming) for a re-
cent survey]. 
  We hypothesize that the inability of these in-
struments to fully implement efficient outcomes 
may be due in part to their relative complexity 
and, more importantly, a lack of understanding 
among subjects regarding how these instruments 
affect payoff (in the lab) and profits (in the field) 
along the lines suggested in Chou et al. (2009). 
Our experiments are related to public good ex-
periments [see Ledyard (1995) for a survey], par-
ticularly those with interior Nash equilibria (Laury 
and Holt 2008). This literature suggests that 
decisions typically fall between the equilibrium 
and the total endowment of the group and that 
decisions in dominant strategy environments are 
less variable than decisions in non-dominant 
strategy environments. Anderson, Goeree, and 
Holt (1998) show that this decision pattern is 
consistent with the quantal response decision er-
ror model and altruism. Spraggon (2004b) shows 
that this result extends to the ambient pollution 
instrument experiments as well. 
  To address this line of inquiry, we focus on 
improving the provided description of these in-
struments in order to highlight the incentives they 
create. In previous experiments, the inefficiencies 
observed with the implementation of exogenous 
targeting instruments with heterogeneous agents 
have been attributed to larger capacity subjects 
being able to use these instruments to force 
smaller capacity subjects out of the industry 
(Suter, Vossler, and Poe 2009, Spraggon 2004b). 
  Such deviations from predicted Nash behavior 
may be due to subjects not understanding the 
game (Chou et al. 2009), non-standard prefer-
ences [e.g., social preferences (see Spraggon 
2004b)], and beliefs about other behavior [for 
example, Cason and Sharma (2007) and Camerer 
and Fehr (2006)]. The use of recommended play 
and alternate presentations of payoff information 
allows us to disentangle these causes of behavior. 
For example, if individuals’ behaviors do not 
change with the provision of recommended play 
(as in Oxoby and McLeish 2004), this suggests 
that behavior is due to either preferences em-
bodying motives beyond pure payoff maximiza-
tion or beliefs about the preferences of others 
(Cason and Sharma 2007). On the other hand, if 
individuals’ behaviors change based on recom-
mendations with the presentation of payoff in-
formation (as in Chou et al. 2009, Charness, Fre-
chette, and Kagel 2004, and Croson and Marks 
2001), this suggests that decision error is affect-
ing individuals’ choices and that this added in-
formation reduces these errors. 
  In the current experiment we describe the 
incentives created by these instruments by em-
phasizing that there exists a dominant strategy 
where the benefit to the player from increasing 
his or her decision number (emission) by one unit 
is equal to the cost of doing so, thereby reducing 
decision errors and making clear the incentives 
provided by the instrument. We also include a 
payoff table to further clarify the decision making 
environment. This paper builds on previous work 
discussed in Spraggon and Oxoby (2009) and 
Oxoby and Spraggon (2008). Spraggon and 
Oxoby (2009) show that when subjects are fa-
miliar with the concepts of game theory they are 
much more likely to choose decisions that are 
consistent with the predictions of standard theory. 
Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) show that describing 
the marginal decision making nature of the prob-
lem results in significantly more compliance but 
does not have a significant effect on efficiency. 
Our procedures follow these studies by exploring 
whether the efficiency of two ambient pollution 
mechanisms can be improved when participants 
are provided with both information on marginal 
decision making and a payoff table. 
  The effects of a detailed presentation of the 
incentives created by an exogenous targeting in-
strument and a payoff table are striking: we ob-
serve significant changes in individuals’ behavior 
with this information. Specifically, individuals’ 
decisions more closely match Nash predictions on 
average, and we observe greater aggregate effi-
ciency. This suggests that the deviations we ob-
serve from theoretical, wealth-maximizing deci-
sions are due not to alternate preference specifi-
cation, but rather to errors. Moreover, our results 
demonstrate that the careful presentation of infor-
mation to users of these instruments can reduce 
these errors, resulting in the implementation of 
more efficient outcomes. This emphasizes the po-264    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
tential for recommendations (as in Croson and 
Marks 2001) and payoff tables (as in Charness, 
Frechette, and Kagel 2004) to guide behavior in 
(relatively) complex decision environments. On a 
broader scale, these results increase the degree of 
optimism regarding the efficacy of exogenous 
targeting instruments in the field and support the 





Our decision environment is based on the stan-
dard linear exogenous targeting instrument (e.g., 
Segerson 1988). In this environment, an exoge-
nous group target is set and individuals are taxed 
and (potentially) subsidized when group decisions 
exceed or fall below this target. The tax and sub-
sidy rates are chosen such that the mechanism im-
plements the socially optimal outcome as a Nash 
equilibrium. Such instruments are often used in 
the study of environmental problems (non-point 
source pollution) and team production environ-
ments. 
  In our experiment participants choose decision 
numbers with payoffs based on a private compo-
nent and a group component. The private payoff 
function Bn is increasing in a participant’s deci-
sion number and given by 
 
(1) 
max 2 ( ) 25 0.002( ) nn n n Bx x x =− − , 
 
where  xn is subject n’s decision number and 
max
n x is the subject n’s maximum decision number. 
The quadratic payoff function was chosen to en-
sure that the equilibrium decision was not on a 
boundary of the decision space. 
  We utilized sixteen groups of four subjects 
with heterogeneous participants. That is, two 
subjects had a maximum decision number of 100 
and two subjects had a maximum decision num-
ber of 125. We refer to these different types as 
medium and large capacity subjects. 
  The group component of participants’ payoffs 
is such that the higher the aggregate decision 
number (the sum of decision numbers within a 
group), the lower the group payoff. We investi-
gated two instruments, both involving a tax if the 
aggregate decision number exceeded the target. 
The instrument which we refer to as the tax/sub-
sidy instrument also subsidized participants when 
the aggregate decision fell below the target. The 
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is the aggregate decision number (referred to as 
the group total). Given a tax/subsidy rate of 0.3 
and the number of subjects per group (N=4), 
maximizing the group’s payoff yields the target 
of 150. 
  Under the tax/subsidy instrument, participants’ 
best response for any X is 
*m a x 75. nn xx =−    Under 
the tax instrument, a participant’s best response is 
also 
*m a x 75. nn xx =−  However, if X<150, a par-
ticipant could increase her payoff by increasing 
her decision number to the point that X=150. 
Since all participants share this incentive, the 
unique Nash equilibrium is 
*m a x 75 nn xx =−  for all 
participants. We refer to the outcome where par-
ticipants choose 
*m a x 75 nn xx = −  as socially opti-
mal as this solves the social planner’s problem in 
which the aggregate benefit to the individuals 
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To be clear, under the tax/subsidy instrument the 
socially optimal outcome is a dominant strategy 
Nash equilibrium. But group payoff is maximized 
when all subjects choose zero. This, however, is 
not a Nash equilibrium. Under the tax instrument 
the socially optimal outcome is a Nash equilib-
rium but it is not dominant, in that if individuals 
believe that others will choose numbers that are 
below the Nash prediction it is in their best inter-
est to choose higher numbers. As a result, we 
might expect to see subjects choosing numbers 
that are lower than the theoretical prediction un-Spraggon and Oxoby  Ambient-Based Policy Instruments: The Role of Recommendations and Presentation   265 
 
 
der the tax/subsidy instrument if they are attracted 
to the group optimal outcome, and subjects choos-
ing numbers that are higher than the theoretical 
prediction if they believe that others might choose 
lower numbers under the tax instrument. Notice 
that deviations of both kinds reduce the overall 
efficiency in the system, either because emissions 
are being reduced below the cost-effective level 
or because they are not being reduced enough. 
  The experiment was conducted over a com-
puter network. Private payoffs were presented in 
a table with the instrument presented as a function 
[equation (2) or (3)]. Participants also had an on-
screen profit calculator permitting them to calcu-
late their payoff (private plus group component) 
from any feasible combination of their decision 
number and the aggregate decision number. 
  While experiments in similar environments 
suggest that subjects fail to choose the dominant 
strategy Nash equilibrium (e.g., Spraggon 2004b), 
Spraggon and Oxoby (2009) suggest that subjects 
who are familiar with the concepts of strategic 
decision making are more likely to make deci-
sions consistent with the predictions of theory. 
Following along these lines, we are interested in 
identifying how providing participants with a 
more complete description of the environment 
(through recommended play and access to a pay-
off table) affects decision making. Our general 
hypothesis is that providing participants with bet-
ter information about how an ambient pollution 
mechanism affects payoffs will effectively in-
crease the decision making sophistication of parti-
cipants with respect to that instrument, thereby 
resulting in greater Nash decision making and 
efficient implementation of the pollution target. 
  We conduct two treatments: a standard instruc-
tion treatment (which we refer to as standard) and 
a treatment with enhanced instructions comple-
mented by a payoff table (which we refer to as 
enhanced). The difference between the instruc-
tions lies in the description of the private payoff 
function, which was an explanation of “marginal 
decision making.” The following is the relevant 
part of the enhanced instructions: 
 
The purpose of the Group Payoff is to ensure that every-
one chooses a certain Decision Number. Notice that by 
increasing your Decision Number by one you increase 
your Private Payoff by the number given in the third 
column of Table 1. However, by increasing your Deci-
sion Number by one you reduce the Group Payoff by 
0.3. As a result you maximize your Total Payoff by in-
creasing your decision number to the point where in-
creasing your decision number by one more will increase 
your Private Payoff by less than 0.3. 
 
Subjects were provided with hypothetical nu-
merical examples and a question to test their un-
derstanding in both treatments.
1 
  The payoff table (specific to each participant’s 
capacity and instrument) indicated the total pay-
off (private plus group components) for feasible 
decision number choices and aggregate decision 
numbers. Given the size of the decision space, the 
payoff from each decision number was provided 
in intervals of five (e.g., the payoff from choosing 
0, 5, 10, ..., 145, 150). Our goal here was to pro-
vide an alternate presentation of how payoffs are 





We find that when participants are provided with 
enhanced instructions and the payoff table, indi-
vidual-level decisions are much closer to the theo-
retical predictions, which results in a significant 
increase in efficiency. 
  The data was collected from sessions con-
ducted at the University of Calgary with 64 parti-
cipants recruited from the undergraduate popula-
tion. Each experiment consisted of 25 decision 
making periods and lasted approximately 90 min-
utes. Average earnings were between $10 and 
$25 (Canadian). 
  Primarily we are interested in whether or not 
the improved instructions result in individuals be-
ing more likely to choose their payoff-maximi-
zing decision (which corresponds to the socially 
optimal decision). In addition, we also investigate 
whether the instruments are able to induce the 
group to choose the target level of emissions and 
the efficiencies obtained under each treatment. 
We measure efficiency as the difference between 
the optimal and actual value of the Social Plan-
ner’s problem [equation (4)] as a percentage of 
the difference between the optimal and minimum 
possible value of the Social Planner’s problem. 
This definition accounts not only for differences 
between the group total and the target, but for 
                                                                                    
1 Instructions are available at http://www.umass.edu/resec/faculty/ 
spraggon/. 266    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
reductions in payoff due to decision numbers that 
differ from individually optimal levels.
2 
  We conduct our analysis in two stages. First we 
consider the differences across treatments for 
individual decisions. Here we have a total of 
1,600 observations across both instruction and 
tax-tax/subsidy treatments. Although this data is 
not independent, the Nash equilibria are unique, 
and therefore identical decisions should be made 
in each period. We therefore employ standard 
techniques and evaluate the deviations from Nash 
behavior as summarized in the distributions of 
individual choices. Second, we consider decisions 
at the aggregate level. That is, at the group level 
(i.e., four participants facing the same mecha-
nism, tax or tax/subsidy) does the introduction of 
enhanced instructions result in differences in ag-
gregate decisions numbers or aggregate efficiency 
of the group? At this level, we have 16 independ-
ent group-level observations: 3 observations for 
each of the instruments with enhanced instruc-
tions and 5 observations for each of the instru-
ments with the standard instructions. For this 
analysis, means were calculated for each four-
subject group, and the mean of these means is 
calculated for each treatment cell. 
 
Analysis at the Individual Level 
 
Table 1 describes individual decisions by treat-
ment and subject type. Recall that subjects were 
in groups of four, two large capacity and two me-
dium capacity. Each chooses a decision number 
between 0 and 125 or 0 and 100 respectively over 
twenty-five consecutive decision periods. Infor-
mation on payoff and aggregate group decision 
were reported after each period. As discussed ear-
lier the theoretical prediction was 50 for the large 
capacity subjects and 25 for the medium capacity 
subjects.
3 The table shows that the enhanced in-
structions with table treatment led to decisions 
that were most consistent with the theoretical pre-
diction. For both of the instruments and subject 
types, means are closest to the theoretical predic-
tion, while medians and modes are identical with 
                                                                                    
2 For example, if two large capacity subjects chose 75 and two me-
dium capacity subjects each chose 0, the group total would be 150, but 
the efficiency of this outcome would be only 89 percent due to the two 
choices which are not individually optimal. 
3 We are unconcerned with dynamic Nash equilibria as our interest is 
in whether or not these instruments induce compliance empirically. 
enhances instructions, which is not the case with 
standard instructions. 
  With the enhanced instructions, for the tax/ 
subsidy instrument in periods 11–20, nearly 52 
percent of decisions are either 50 or 51 for the 
large capacity subjects, and 55 percent of deci-
sions are 25 for the medium capacity subjects. 
We do not observe any evidence for subjects at-
tempting to implement the collusive outcome 
where everyone chooses zero. Less than 17 per-
cent of decisions are below the Nash prediction 
(for both the large and medium capacity subjects). 
The results are not quite as strong for the tax in-
strument, with only 19 percent of decisions being 
50 or 51 for large capacity subjects, and 28 per-
cent of decisions being between 24 and 26 for the 
medium capacity subjects. For both subject types 
there are smaller peaks at slightly higher decision 
numbers. For the large capacity subjects, 28 per-
cent of decisions are between 55 and 57, while 
for the medium capacity subjects 24 percent of 
decisions are between 35 and 40. These results 
are consistent with the Laury and Holt (2008) 
conclusion that decisions are less variable in 
dominant strategy environments. 
  With the standard instructions, the distributions 
of decisions are much flatter. For the tax/subsidy 
instrument in periods 11–20, 21 percent of deci-
sions are zero and only 3 percent are between 50 
and 52 (13 percent are between 44 and 46) for the 
large capacity subjects. For the medium capacity 
subjects, 28 percent of decisions are zero, 7 per-
cent are 25. For the tax instrument, 27 percent of 
decisions are 50 for the large capacity subjects, 
while for the medium capacity subjects the largest 
peaks are at 40 with 15 percent of decisions, and 
50 with 10 percent of decisions (only 1 percent of 
decisions are 25). 
  Figures 1 through 4 depict just how dramatic 
the differences between the standard and enhanced 
with table treatments are and show that the differ-
ences are consistent over time. Figures 1 and 2 
compare the time-series of decisions for standard 
and enhanced instructions for the tax/subsidy. 
Notice that there is not much difference between 
the decisions of large and medium capacity sub-
jects under the standard instructions. In contrast, 
decision making for the enhanced instructions is 
remarkably consistent with the prediction of the-
ory for both subject types. This is also true for the 
tax instrument (Figures 3 and 4). Spraggon and Oxoby  Ambient-Based Policy Instruments: The Role of Recommendations and Presentation   267 
 
 
Table 1. Mean Median and Modal Decision Numbers by Treatment 
 Standard  Instructions  Enhanced Instructions  






37.5 0  49.03 
(1.30) 
50 50 
N 250  150 
         
Medium Capacity  31.72 
(1.51) 
30 0  23.74 
(1.00) 
25 25 
N 250  150 
TAX  
Large Capacity  59.12 
(1.15) 
60 50  49.27 
(1.20) 
50 50 
N 250  150 
         
Medium Capacity  43.53 
(1.29) 
45 50  28.29 
(1.19) 
25 25 
N 250  150 
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Figure 2. Mean Decision Number by Subject Capacity, for Tax/Subsidy, Enhanced Instructions 
 
  To determine whether or not average decisions 
are statistically significantly different from the 
theoretical prediction, we use regression analysis. 
Since decisions are constrained both from above 
and below, we use Tobit regression [see Greene 
(2000, chapter 20)]. Table 2 presents the results 
of four regressions conducted by subject capacity 
and instrument. We used a random effects Tobit 
regression to account for having repeated obser-
vations for individuals over time: 
   1 it it i it decision Enhanced =α+β +ν +ε , 
where i indexes individual and t indexes period, 
Enhanced is a dummy variable to account for the 
enhanced instruction treatment, νi captures indi-
vidual specific errors, and εit is a standard error 
term. The results are clear: in all cases except the 
medium capacity subject under the tax subsidy 
instrument, the enhanced instructions result in 
decisions closer to the theoretical prediction. That 
there is no significant effect of the enhanced in-
structions for the medium capacity subjects is not 
surprising as both Table 1 and Figure 1 suggest 
that decisions are reasonably close to the theoreti-
cal prediction for these subjects. Standard non-
parametric tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-
Whitney) also support this result. For each of the 
two instruments (tax/subsidy and tax) and two 
subject types (large and medium), these tests 
reject the null hypothesis that the distributions of 
individual decisions are the same across treat-
ments in all cases. The largest p-value (0.0909) is 
for the tax instrument, with large capacity sub-
jects comparing the standard and enhanced treat-
ments. 
Analysis at the Aggregate Level 
Table 3 presents the aggregate outcomes for each 
of the treatments.
4 For both the tax/subsidy and 
tax instruments, aggregate decisions are more 
                                                                                    
4 Each cell of Table 3 contains the mean and median of the aggregate 
group total for each of the observations in the session. As a result, the 
standard errors represent the variation between the number of sessions 
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Figure 3. Mean Decision Number by Subject Capacity, for Tax, Standard Instructions 
 
 
similar to the target under the enhanced instruc-
tions rather than the standard instructions (Table 
1). This difference is statistically significant for 
the tax instrument (p=0.0253 for the Mann-
Whitney test) but not the tax/subsidy instrument 
(p=0.8815). Analysis of variance on the 16 ses-
sion means using experience, treatment, and ex-
perience crossed with treatment as explanatory 
variables suggests that there are no significant 
differences between the treatments (all of the p-
values are above 0.11). Indeed, simple t-tests 
based on the standard errors from the data suggest 
that only the group total for the tax instrument 
with standard instructions is significantly differ-
ent from the target (p=0.0030; p-values for the 
other treatments are all greater than 0.1458). That 
the aggregate decision numbers are very consis-
tent with the target replicates the results of previ-
ous studies (Suter, Vossler, and Poe 2009, Voss-
ler et al. 2006, Cochard, Willinger, and Xepapa-
deas 2005, Poe et al. 2004, and Spraggon 2002, 
2004a). Figures 5 and 6, which depict the time-
series of aggregate decision by treatment and in-
struction type, support the observations from 
Table 3. Figure 5 shows that there is very little 
difference in the aggregate decision for the tax/ 
subsidy instrument. Figure 6 suggests that aggre 
gate decisions are always higher with the standard 
instructions for the tax instruments. 
  There does seem to be an improvement in effi-
ciency for the enhanced instructions over the 
standard instructions under both instruments (Ta-
ble 3). The Mann-Whitney U test (p=0.0253 
tax/subsidy, p=0.0526 tax) and analysis of vari-
ance p=0.011 both suggest that this difference is 
statistically significant. Figures 7 and 8 show that 
these differences are broadly consistent over time. 
  The observations that aggregate decisions are 
quite similar and that there is a significant differ-
ence in efficiency is a direct result of decisions 
among the subjects who received the enhanced 
instructions being much closer to the theoretical 
predictions. 
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Table 2. Regression Results 
                      Large, Tax  Medium, Tax  Large Tax/Subsidy  Medium Tax/Subsidy 























N  400 400 400 400 
Note: Results from random effect tobit regression: decisionit = α + βEnhancedit + νi + εit. * represents p < 0.05, ** represents p < 





Our results demonstrate the value of the presen-
tation of payoff information on the efficacy of 
ambient pollution instruments in economic ex-
periments. In our treatment with standard instruc-
tions, we observed significant decision errors in 
the face of an exogenous targeting instrument. 
Relative to this treatment, recommended play 
(i.e., a description of the application of marginal 
decision making in the decision environment) and 
the presentation of payoff information in a table 
increased the efficiency of the instrument by in-
creasing the consistency of decision making in 
line with the theoretical prediction. 
  It appears that recommended play and the pres-
entation of a payoff table clearly demonstrate to Spraggon and Oxoby  Ambient-Based Policy Instruments: The Role of Recommendations and Presentation   271 
 
 








Enhanced Instructions  145.55 (144) 
(15.44) 
[3] 
79.10 212.00  96.40 
(0.36) 
[3] 
Standard Instructions  133.50 (141) 
(32.69) 
[5] 




Enhanced Instructions  155.12 (155) 
(2.20) 
[3] 
145.64 164.50  96.13 
(1.82) 
[3] 
Standard Instructions  205.30 (201) 
(8.59) 
[5] 
181.45 229.15  89.59 
(1.30) 
[5] 
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Figure 6. Mean Group Totals by Treatment and Period, Tax Instrument 
 
 
participants how to make profit-maximizing deci-
sions in a (relatively) complex environment. While 
the flavor of recommended play utilized here 
emphasizes the tools individuals should use in 
making their decisions (i.e., marginal analysis), 
the payoff table clearly demonstrates to partici-
pants that they have a dominant strategy. The 
coupling of recommended play with the payoff 
table results in a clear increase in Nash decision 
making on the part of participants. These results 
are in line with the work of authors such as Chou 
et al. (2009) and Charness, Frechette, and Kagel 
(2004), who provide support for the predictions 
of game theory when subjects understand the 
form of the game. 
  Our result should be considered promising with 
regard to the use of ambient pollution mecha-
nisms in the field. Shortle and Horan (2001) point 
out many of the problems that plague non-point 
source pollution mechanisms and their applica-
bility in the field. Our experiments demonstrate 
that, as Cabe and Herriges (1992) suggest, when 
coupled with effective information on the use and 
consequences of these instruments, tax and tax/ 
subsidy mechanisms can efficiently implement 
pollution targets. These results suggest that poli-
cymakers can effectively use these instruments in 
the field where decision makers (i.e., firms) are 
experienced in making profit-maximizing deci-
sions. By educating polluters in terms of how 
these instruments affect the profits of firms, poli-
cymakers should be able to implement targets for 
non-point source polluters efficiently through the 
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